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Abstract— Patent assertion entities are playing an increasing 
role in patent policy and patent litigation, both in the U.S. and 
Europe. Analyzing the resulting case law, mainly in the 
SEP/FRAND context, this article shows similarities as well as 
differences in the approaches taken by U.S. and EU courts.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
It is nearly impossible to discuss patent policy today 
without mentioning the phenomenon of patent assertion entities 
(PAEs). PAEs are firms that are in the business of patent 
monetization: they acquire patents from a variety of sources 
and then seek to collect revenue from companies 
manufacturing and selling covered products. More 
pejoratively, PAEs are known as patent “trolls”. 1  PAEs 
typically obtain patents from third parties: failed start-ups, 
bankruptcy estates, companies abandoning all or part of their 
business activity, individual inventors, or operating companies 
that are simply seeking to earn revenue from under-utilized 
patent assets [5][7]. In some cases, operating companies may 
retain an interest in patents transferred to PAEs in an 
arrangement that has been referred to as “privateering” 
[41][42]. One recent study found that approximately 80% of 
patents asserted by PAEs were obtained from operating 
companies [19].  Unlike operating firms, the principal reason 
that most PAEs acquire patents is to assert them for the 
purpose of generating revenue, either through licensing, 
litigation settlements or damages awards [3][13].  
One source reports that in 2016, approximately 69% of the 
patent cases filed in the U.S. were filed by PAEs [1]. While 
there is some disagreement regarding the precise number, size 
and impact of PAE lawsuits, most studies suggest that a 
significant portion of recent U.S. patent litigation is attributable 
to PAEs [3][10][6][7][8][13]. PAE activity is significant in 
Europe as well. One recent study finds that PAEs accounted for 
approximately 19% of patent assertions between 2000 and 
2008 in Germany and 9% of patent assertions between 2000 
                                                            
1 The term non-practicing entity (NPE) is also used in this 
context, though NPEs, which are entities that do not manufacture or 
sell products covered by their patents, include universities and 
government R&D labs. PAEs are generally considered a subset of 
NPEs. 
and 2013 in England and Wales [9]. Additional questions 
regarding PAE assertions in Europe arise with the approach of 
EU-wide injunctions under the new Unified Patent Court 
(UPC) system which could come into force soon [19][20].2 
PAE litigation has been characterized by many 
commentators and policy makers as a distinct phenomenon, 
differing in many ways from ordinary patent litigation among 
operating entities. This distinction, and the perceived threat 
posed by PAEs, has even been noticed by the U.S. Supreme 
Court.3 On one hand, critics fear that PAE litigation clogs the 
judicial system, drains resources from research, innovation and 
product development, harms small businesses, and increases 
the cost of products and services across industries [11][12]. 
Defenders of PAEs counter that these entities are operating 
within their legal rights by asserting patents duly issued by 
governmental agencies, and that their ability to monetize 
under-utilized patents provides needed liquidity to the market 
and helps innovators who are unable to compete directly with 
large enterprises [8][14]. 
In this article, we do not attempt to solve the intractable 
policy questions surrounding the PAE phenomenon Instead, we 
ask whether the judicial law that has evolved concerning PAEs 
is substantively different than the law governing patent 
litigation more generally. 4  We focus in part on litigation 
concerning patents that are essential to industry standards such 
as Wi-Fi and 4G LTE because, with the advent of the global 
“smart phone wars”, standards-related litigation has become 
increasingly prominent [31], there is evidence that substantial 
                                                            
2 As of this writing, the UPC system is on hold as the United 
Kingdom (due to the “Brexit” process and the recent elections) and 
Germany (due to a request by the Constitutional Court) have 
suspended the ratification process. 
3 As discussed in Part II.A below, the Supreme Court took 
explicit notice of PAEs in its 2006 decision in eBay v. MercExchange 
[15]. This year, in TC Heartland v. Kraft Foods, the Supreme Court, 
without mentioning PAEs by name, severely limited the ability of 
patent holders to bring suit in jurisdictions such as the notorious 
Eastern District of Texas, that have traditionally been viewed as 
magnets for PAE litigation [16][17].  
4 Our focus is on the laws of the United States and Europe, 
though PAE litigation is rapidly becoming a global phenomenon. 
Likewise, we focus on the law developed through judicial decisions.  
There have been numerous proposals, primarily in the United States, 
to curb PAE litigation through legislative action [3]. 
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numbers of standards-related patent lawsuits have been 
initiated by PAEs [21][19][22], and several of the legal 
adjustments made by courts with respect to PAEs have arisen 
in this area. 
II. PAES AND THE LAW IN THE UNITED STATES 
A. Injunctions 
 Prior to eBay v MercExchange [15], the holder of a valid 
U.S. patent was more or less assured of obtaining an 
injunction to prevent an infringer from producing or selling 
infringing products. This longstanding rule was altered in 
eBay, in which the Supreme Court introduced a 4-factor 
equitable test that lower courts must now apply before issuing 
an injunction. It provides that an injunction will not issue 
unless the plaintiff can demonstrate: 
 
(1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury;  
(2) that remedies available at law [i.e., monetary damages] 
are inadequate to compensate it for that injury;  
(3) that considering the balance of hardships between the 
plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and  
(4) that the public interest would not be disserved by the 
award of an injunction. 
In a separate opinion concurring with the Court’s result, 
four justices expressed their concern with PAE suits, observing 
that in recent years “[a]n industry has developed in which firms 
use patents not as a basis for producing or selling goods but, 
instead, primarily for obtaining licensing fees” (p. 396). The 
justices explained their support for the new injunction standard 
in view of the fact that such entities could use injunctive relief 
as “a bargaining tool to charge exorbitant fees to companies 
that seek to buy licenses to practice the patent” (id.). 
Accordingly, these justices seemingly urge lower courts to 
view requests for injunctive relief by PAEs with a degree of 
skepticism. 
The principal difficulty that PAEs experience in seeking 
injunctive relief under eBay is Factor 2: the patent holder must 
show that its injury cannot adequately be compensated through 
an award of monetary damages. Because PAEs have no 
business other than asserting patents for financial gain, it has 
been argued that, by definition, they are fully compensated by 
monetary damages, making the issuance of an injunction 
unnecessary [13][30]. Under this theory, permitting PAEs to 
seek injunctive relief would simply give them additional and 
inappropriate leverage to seek higher royalties in licensing 
negotiations [30].5 
As a result, the ability of PAEs to obtain injunctive relief in 
the U.S. after eBay has been significantly curtailed. One recent 
study finds that while permanent injunctions were issued in 
approximately 75% of U.S. patent cases, PAEs were successful 
in obtaining injunctive relief only 16% of the time [23].  
                                                            
5 That is, an allegedly infringing product manufacturer would 
likely accept a license at a higher rate if the patentee could threaten to 
block its sale of products through an injunction. 
Interestingly, this result does not hold with respect to 
exclusion orders issued by the U.S. International Trade 
Commission (ITC). As an administrative agency, the ITC is 
authorized to prohibit the importation into the U.S. of goods 
that infringe U.S. intellectual property rights [28]. Such an 
exclusion order will only be issued if the asserted patent rights 
affect a domestic industry.  However, the statute provides that 
‘licensing’ activity is sufficient to constitute a domestic U.S. 
industry, and ITC exclusion orders have routinely been issued 
in favor of patents held by PAEs [30][36]. 
B. Damages 
1) Lost Profits 
In the U.S., a patentee that proves infringement of its valid 
patent is entitled to recover “damages adequate to compensate 
for the infringement, but in no event less than a reasonable 
royalty”. In addition to damages based on a reasonable royalty, 
patent holders may also attempt to recover damages based on 
the profits that they have foregone as a result of the 
infringement (so-called “lost profits” damages). In theory, lost 
profits damages award the patent holder the entire monopoly 
value of excluding competitors from the marketplace, while 
reasonable royalty damages only award it a market-based fee 
for allowing competition [25]. As explained by the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, “[n]ormally, if the patentee 
is not selling a product, by definition there can be no lost 
profits” [26]. And because PAEs do not themselves sell 
products, courts have generally not awarded lost profits 
damages to PAEs [27]. 
2) Reasonable Royalties 
Without lost profits, PAEs may only seek reasonable 
royalty damages. In the U.S., reasonable royalty damages are 
intended to reflect the incremental value that a patented 
technology contributes to a product [33]. Such damages are 
often calculated using an analytical framework in which the 
court or jury seeks to determine what royalty the parties would 
have agreed in a hypothetical negotiation immediately prior to 
the time of infringement [34]. 
But while lost profits (the entire profit on a patented 
product) are often assumed to be higher than reasonable 
royalties (the royalty payable to a single patent holder), 
litigation data show that NPEs have consistently obtained 
median reasonable royalty damages awards substantially in 
excess of those obtained by practicing entities [13][12][27]. 
For example, Pricewaterhouse Coopers reports that between 
2011 and 2016, median damage awards in suits brought by 
NPEs were 3.8 higher than awards in suits brought by 
practicing entities [27].6 
There are several possible explanations for this 
discrepancy. First, PAEs, which lack an internal product 
strategy, may select patents for enforcement based solely on 
their potential monetary value, rather than their strategic or 
market value to the plaintiff’s product or business lines. 
Likewise, PAEs may bring suit against any market participant 
                                                            
6 These statistics include awards to non-PAE NPEs such as 
research universities, which have been responsible for some of the 
largest recent patent awards. 
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based solely on its attractiveness as a financial target, without 
regard to strategic, supply chain or customer relationships (i.e., 
a component vendor might be reluctant to sue its largest 
customer, notwithstanding that customer’s infringement of the 
vendor’s patents). 7  Third, PAEs, which have no product 
markets to defend, are less susceptible to counterclaims and 
injunctive threats against their own products, making “total 
war” possible without reciprocal consequences. And finally, 
PAEs, as repeat players, may simply be better at patent 
litigation than one-off producers. Thus, unlike the typical 
manufacturing firm, PAEs (or their owners) may have a ready 
arsenal of litigators, claim charts, briefs, economics experts and 
the like to bring to bear at costs that reflect economies of scale, 
as well as a dedicated litigation war chest. 
In view of these considerations, some scholars have 
suggested that U.S. patent damages law be recalibrated to 
reduce inappropriately high PAE recoveries. One such 
proposal would allow a patentee to recover substantial 
monetary damages only when it has undertaken efforts to 
produce or market the patented invention [29]. This limitation 
would effectively impose a so-called “working requirement” 
on reasonable royalty damages, a result that scholars argue is 
consistent with the historical development of damages law in 
the United States [29].8 If such an approach were adopted 
(something that would likely require a statutory amendment), it 
would have a significant impact on the incentives for PAEs to 
bring patent suits and, indeed, to remain in business at all. 
Another, less drastic, proposal would revamp the 
reasonable royalty damages framework [34] when “willing 
licensors” (patent holders that are willing to grant licenses to 
infringers) sue infringers that did not intentionally copy the 
patented technology (“innocent” infringers) [30]. Under this 
revised framework, reasonable royalty damages would be 
based solely on information available to the parties in a 
hypothetical negotiation occurring on the date that the infringer 
became committed to using the patented technology [30]. This 
approach has already gained traction in the context of 
standards-essential patents (damages should be based on the 
royalty rate that would have been agreed by the parties before 
the patented technology was adopted in a standard [33][35]), 
but could also be extended to patents outside the standards area 
[30]. 
C. Patent Transfers to PAEs 
As noted above, most PAEs obtain their patents from 
others: operating companies, research institutions, individual 
inventors, and the like [5][7]. Ordinarily, when assets are 
transferred from one party to another, the transferee is not 
obligated to fulfill promises made by the transferor to third 
                                                            
7  In fact, some large customers in industries such as 
semiconductor manufacturing require their vendors to refrain from 
suing the customer’s other vendors, in order to assure a stable supply 
chain. 
8 Working requirements condition the ability to enforce a legal 
right on the active exploitation of that right. Because PAEs do not 
“work” their patents through manufacture or sale of products, a 
number of proposals have been made seeking to limit PAEs’ ability 
to enforce patents based on non-working. 
parties absent a binding covenant or contractual commitment to 
do so. Nonetheless, PAEs that have tried to disavow such 
promises, especially in the case of standards-essential patents, 
have encountered resistance both from industry and U.S. 
antitrust agencies. The first such instance that gained 
widespread attention occurred in 2008, when a PAE known as 
Negotiated Data Solutions (N-Data) acquired patents covering 
IEEE’s 802.3 Fast Ethernet standard [38]. The original 
patentee, National Semiconductor, had committed to IEEE that 
it would license the patents to manufacturers of compliant 
products at a flat rate of $1,000. After acquiring the patents, N-
Data announced that it would seek higher rates. Following 
industry complaints, the U.S. Federal Trade Commission 
brought an action alleging that N-Data’s disavowal of 
National’s earlier $1,000 commitment constituted an unfair 
method of competition and an unfair act or practice under 
Section 5 of the FTC Act [39]. Similar concerns were raised 
when newly-formed Rockstar Bidco sought to acquire a large 
portfolio of patents from then-bankrupt Nortel Networks 
without adhering to Nortel’s prior licensing commitments to 
standards bodies [31]. In order to secure the assets, Rockstar 
eventually agreed to honor those commitments. 
As a result of actions like these, PAEs that acquire patents 
that were once subject to standards-based licensing 
commitments typically agree to abide by those commitments. 
Nevertheless, the legal theories that would require these 
commitments on downstream transferees of patents are 
untested in the courts and remain uncertain, at best [32].  
A different set of antitrust concerns has recently arisen in 
the context of “privateering”, in which operating companies 
transfer patents to PAEs for assertion, usually while retaining 
some financial interest in the outcome of the litigation [41][42]. 
Commentators have theorized that a range of antitrust claims 
could potentially be brought against operating companies and 
PAEs that conspire to raise rivals’ costs through patent 
transfers such as these [42]. 
In one recent case Apple alleged that Nokia, the holder of a 
large patent portfolio covering wireless telecommunications 
standards, conspired with Acacia and other PAEs to divide 
Nokia’s portfolio and assert its patents separately [40]. Apple 
alleges that this conduct was intended to “diffuse and abuse” 
Nokia’s portfolio by forcing manufacturers to defend multiple 
suits and collecting “far more in royalties than [Nokia] could 
have sought on its own”. Such privateering conduct was 
alleged to have violated both Nokia’s commitments to the 
standards body (ETSI) and U.S. antitrust law [40].  
 
III. PAES AND THE LAW IN EUROPE 
A. Overall treatment by courts 
 As in the U.S., PAEs have been involved in significant 
patent litigation in Europe [9], including significant litigation 
involving SEPs [22].  Accordingly, a number of European 
scholars have proposed restrictions on PAE litigation activity 
[43] [44][45]. Courts, however, have not generally been hostile 
toward PAEs [43][46]. On the contrary, courts in Europe seem 
hesitant to draw patent law or competition law consequences 
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based solely on the fact that a party is a PAE. German courts, 
for instance, have stated explicitly that they see no reason to 
treat PAEs differently from any other patent owners [47]. 
Hence, for the time being, the general rules of EU and Member 
State law on SEP enforcement and FRAND licensing are the 
yardstick for the lion’s share of PAE activity in Europe. 
Whether this attitude may change in the face of increasing PAE 
activity remains to be seen.  
B. Injunctions 
It must be kept in mind that, at present, there is no such 
thing as “EU patent law”. Instead, patent laws and their rules 
on injunctions are national and may differ from Member State 
to Member State, although the European Patent Convention 
[50] and a shared patent law tradition provide a certain degree 
of homogeneity. German patent law, for instance, does not 
limit the right to an injunction in the case of patent 
infringement through an eBay-like balancing test [44][51]. An 
infringer in Germany can, however, resist the entry of an 
injunction by successfully raising defenses such as the 
competition law-based entitlement to a (compulsory) FRAND 
license [43].9  
The starting point for assessing SEP/FRAND cases is the 
prohibition of abuses of market dominance in Art. 102 TFEU 
because SEP ownership can indicate – but does not necessarily 
result in – dominance. Against this background, the success of 
a SEP-owning PAE claiming an injunction depends to a large 
extent on whether the PAE (claimant) and the standard-
implementer/patent infringer (defendant) respectively comply 
with the conduct requirements established by the European 
Court of Justice (ECJ) in its 2015 Huawei v. ZTE decision [52] 
(a case that did not involve a PAE). According to the ECJ a 
SEP owner is able to seek an injunction in spite of having 
made the promise to grant FRAND licenses, but “[…], in order 
to prevent an action for a prohibitory injunction […] from 
being regarded as abusive, the proprietor of an SEP must 
comply with conditions which seek to ensure a fair balance 
between the interests concerned” [52]:  
• Firstly, cannot, without infringing Article 102 TFEU, 
bring an action for a prohibitory injunction or for the recall 
of products against the alleged infringer without notice or 
prior consultation with the alleged infringer, even if the 
SEP has already been used by the alleged infringer.. 
• Secondly, after the alleged infringer has expressed its 
willingness to conclude a licensing agreement, it is for the 
proprietor of the SEP to present a specific, written offer 
for a license on FRAND terms. 
• Thirdly, the standard-implementer, in turn, must diligently 
respond to the SEP holder’s offer, in accordance with 
recognized commercial practices in the field and in good 
faith, abstaining, in particular, from delaying tactics. 
Should the alleged infringer not accept the offer, it must 
submit a specific counter-offer that itself is FRAND. 
                                                            
9 It is worth noting that this competition law defense under 
European law is in addition to any contractual claims that a party 
may have with respect to its entitlement to a FRAND license. 
Furthermore, where the alleged infringer is using the 
teachings of the SEP before a licensing agreement has 
been concluded, it must, from the point at which its 
counter-offer is rejected, provide appropriate security the 
amount of which is calculated on the basis of the royalties 
offered by the implementer. The alleged infringer must be 
able to render an account in respect of its acts of use. 
• Where no agreement is reached on the details of the 
FRAND terms following the counter-offer of the alleged 
infringer, the parties may, by common agreement, request 
that the amount of the royalty be determined by an 
independent third party, by decision without delay. 
 
In consequence (and simplifying somewhat): The patentee 
can obtain an injunction if the standard-implementer fails to 
comply with the above scheme. If the blame lies with the 
patentee, no injunction is issued and the implementer has to be 
granted a FRAND license. If both parties comply but cannot 
reach an agreement, the implementer is still entitled to a 
FRAND license, the conditions of which can be set by an 
“independent third-party”, such as a court or an arbitration 
tribunal. Courts (and maybe at some point the EU legislator or 
the EU Commission) are now in the process of working out 
details of the Huawei framework. Interestingly, the majority of 
these post-Huawei cases involves PAEs and they are frequently 
granted injunctions due to the implementer’s failure to comply 
with the Huawei conduct requirements. Appellate courts have, 
however, suspended the enforcement of a substantial part of 
these decisions because they were not in agreement with the 
lower courts’ interpretation of the Huawei conduct 
requirements or their determination of FRAND licensing 
terms.  
C. Damages 
As the other elements of patent law, damages are mainly 
governed by EU Member State law. Taking § 139 German 
Patent Law as an example, the patent owner can recover 
monetary damages from an infringer that intentionally or 
negligently makes use of a patent under §§ 9, 10 of the German 
Patent Law (PatG) [53][54][55]. To determine the specific 
amount of monetary damages to be paid by the infringer, the 
patent owner can select between three different calculation 
methods pursuant to § 139 (2) PatG. The first method looks at 
the “difference in wealth” on the part of the patent owner 
caused by the infringement (“Differenzmethode”) [56]. If it 
uses this approach to recover lost profits, the patent owner 
must prove that it could have obtained the amount of profits 
claimed in the absence of the infringing activity [55]. The 
second calculation method, often called the “objective 
calculation of damages”, is widely used in practice [55]. It 
refers to the reasonable royalties that could be obtained from a 
third person for the use of the patent [53][54]. The third 
method aims at the disgorgement of the infringer’s profits. 
Since it is only a calculation method and not a standalone 
claim, it must be proven that the IPR owner incurred actual 
losses [53]. Irrespective of the calculation method, courts are 
permitted to estimate the damages to be paid pursuant to § 287 
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German Code of Civil Procedure if the patent owner is not able 
to substantiate its financial losses [54]. 
Claims for damages in the SEP/FRAND context are not 
directly subject to the Huawei conduct requirements as the ECJ 
found that “Article 102 TFEU must be interpreted as not 
prohibiting […] an undertaking in a dominant position and 
holding a SEP […] from bringing an action for infringement 
against the alleged infringer of its SEP and seeking the 
rendering of accounts in relation to past acts of use of that SEP 
or an award of damages in respect of those acts of use” [52]. 
This view has been supported in subsequent decisions rendered 
by German courts [56][57][58][59]. Accordingly, a SEP 
proprietor is not acting abusively under Article 102 TFEU if it 
brings an action for damages, even without having notified the 
standard implementer of the infringement and without having 
offered a FRAND license. However, the Huawei requirements 
may have an indirect impact on the extent to which damages 
and a rendering of accounts are due. While some courts limit 
all damages to FRAND levels in the presence of a FRAND 
commitment, there is also case law holding that, in case of a 
patentee’s failure to comply with Huawei, damages are limited 
to the FRAND royalty level only for the period after the SEP 
proprietor’s abusive refusal to license. Claims for information 
and the rendering of accounts must, in this event, be limited to 
what is necessary for determining these FRAND-based 
damages [56]. In any case, since a PAE does, by definition, not 
produce or market products, the “lost profits” it can recover are 
only such profits as the entity could have realized by licensing 
the asserted patent [54][60].  
D. Patent Transfers to PAEs 
European case law discusses in some detail whether the 
transfer of a patent portfolio to a PAE, especially if motivated 
by the attempt to maximize licensing profits through 
„privateering“ strategies, runs afoul of competition law. For 
example, the Dusseldorf Regional Court has found 
[56][61][62] that such portfolio transfers are not subject to 
merger control. Furthermore, such a portfolio transfer does not 
violate Art. 101, 102 TFEU merely because it is performed for 
the purpose of improving the transferor’s bargaining power or 
the overall return on the patent portfolio in question. Nor is the 
(PAE) transferee generally obliged to continue the licensing 
practice and maintain the licensing conditions of the former 
patentee. This being said, limitations on the transferee’s 
conduct can arise from a FRAND commitment made by the 
prior patent owner, as the German courts state very clearly that 
competition law is violated where a transferee asks for 
licensing conditions above a FRAND level or discriminates 
among implementers [56][61][62]. British case law seems to 
take, for the time being, a slightly different turn as Birss J. 
holds in Unwired Planet v. Huawei, which involved SEPs 
transferred to a PAE by an operating company, that only 
substantial deviations from FRAND royalty levels amount to a 
violation of European competition law [63][64]. The key 
question is where to draw the line beyond which FRAND 
transgressions become anticompetitive. According to the 
Dusseldorf Regional Court  in Unwired Planet v. Samsung 
[56][61][62], this line can be crossed not only based on the 
PAE’s licensing conditions, but also by an accumulation of 
licensing demands made by the PAE-transferee combined with 
those made by the transferor (with respect to its remaining 
portfolio), and potentially other SEP owners. Hence, the court 
obliges the PAE to take into consideration at least the terms 
that are imposed by the transferor, so as to avoid a FRAND 
violation by the cumulative conditions. It is evident that these 
considerations are of great importance to royalty stacking 
situations in general. 
Courts are quite strict when it comes to the potential 
termination of a FRAND commitment after a patent (portfolio) 
transfer: The parties to such transactions are obliged by EU 
competition law to ensure that the PAE-transferee continues to 
be bound by any prior FRAND commitment made by holders 
of the transferred patents [56][61][62]. This can, in particular, 
be achieved through clauses obliging the transferee to honor 
the transferor’s FRAND commitment, to make such a 
commitment itself to the relevant SSO, to abstain from seeking 
non-FRAND terms, and to impose the same obligations on any 
future transferee of the patent(s) in question [56][61][62]. 
While binding a PAE-transferee to an existing FRAND 
commitment can be required by competition law, precise 
agreements regarding the PAE’s future royalty demands may 
be less acceptable. Such agreements can amount to 
anticompetitive price-fixing if, for example, a minimum 
royalty rate is defined. Calculating the purchase price for the 
patents in question by estimating the PAE’s licensing revenues 
based on a pre-defined “applicable royalty rate” did not, 
however, amount to price fixing in [CASE] because the 
transferee was effectively free to charge royalty rates that 
differed from the “applicable” rate [56][61][62]. 
Since PAE-driven patent enforcement is usually preceded 
by the transactional acquisition of the asserted patents, it does 
not come as a surprise that defendants may try to attack the 
validity of these transactions, the patent ownership of the 
PAEs, and, hence, their standing in court. However, German 
courts have considered the registration of a patent owner, even 
a PAE, in the patent register to be a strong indication of the 
patent’s ownership [65][66]. In consequence, courts have 
refused to pay much heed to allegations that patent transactions 
are, on their face, invalid [48][49][56][67][68].10 Although not 
limited to the context of PAEs, this view of the courts is 
certainly supportive of their litigation efforts. 
 
IV. CONCLUSIONS 
PAEs are playing an increasing role in patent litigation in both 
the U.S. and Europe. In response, courts have issued a variety 
of decisions in cases brought by PAEs.  In the U.S., courts, led 
by the concurring justices in the Supreme Court’s seminal 
eBay decision, have expressed concern regarding the impact 
of PAEs on litigation as well as the economy, more broadly.  
While courts have generally stopped short of enacting PAE-
specific rules, a number of limitations on the remedies 
available to PAEs have been established through pre-existing 
doctrines limiting monetary recovery and injunctive relief 
                                                            
10  These decisions discuss many facets of patent ownership 
registration. For additional discussion, see [69]. 
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applicable to non-practicing patent holders. In Europe, courts 
have been more reluctant to view PAEs differently than other 
patent holders. German courts, in particular, tend to follow a 
patentee-friendly approach, irrespective of the patentee’s 
business model. This difference may, on the one hand, result 
from differences in the roles that courts in the U.S. and Europe 
see themselves playing.  In the U.S., for example, courts are 
charged with assessing the impact on the public interest of 
issuing injunctions in patent cases, an analysis that must 
necessarily involve assessments of the incentive value of 
patents as well as the economic impact of judicial rulings not 
only on the litigants, but to consumers and other market 
actors.  In Europe, courts may view their roles as more 
circumscribed, interpreting rules that govern the relationships 
between holders of patent rights, but not extending to broader 
social or economic factors. These differences may, on the 
other hand, be exacerbated by the relatively greater impact of 
PAE litigation on U.S. courts and markets.  With 
comparatively lower damages awards and fewer patent suits 
overall, a more hands-off approach by European courts may 
be viewed as acceptable. As a general tendency, competition 
law is more prominent in the EU while patent law is employed 
more intensely in by US courts. This may be due to the fact 
that, so far, patent law is not harmonized within the EU. 
Whether these differences will be maintained following the – 
still very likely – introduction of the UPC and its creation of a 
Europe-wide litigation system in a combined market larger 
than the U.S. remains to be seen.  
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